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Abstract
Disability Insurance waiting time varies from a few months to several years. We
estimate the causal effect of longer waiting times on the use of five financial coping
strategies. We find that SNAP benefits are the most responsive to longer waiting
times. Moreover, while spousal employment is not responsive to longer wait times,
spousal employment leads to longer waiting times, presumably because these
applicants are more able to appeal. Together, these results suggest that coping
strategies are used to both help applicants during the wait time and to extend the
waiting time and increase their probability of success.
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1. Introduction
A worker with disabilities seeking Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits
must first undergo a multi-layered and potentially lengthy disability determination
process. Approximately one-third of SSDI applicants are awarded benefits during the
first stage of the application process, with an average processing time of 4.3 months;
for those few who appeal all the way through to the deferral courts, the average pro-
cessing time is 57 months (Autor and Duggan 2010). During the application and ap-
peals processes, SSDI applicants receive no income support or medical benefits from
the SSDI program. However, they face strong incentives to remain out of the labor
force because evidence of gainful employment would disqualify their application1.
While considerable attention has been paid to how health insurance coverage and
earnings change after disability onset, much less is known about how individuals with
disabilities fund their consumption during the application process. Two notable excep-
tions include Bound et al. (2003) and Honeycutt (2004). Both papers find that income
from government transfers and temporary disability insurance programs partially offset
the decline in SSDI applicants’ own labor earnings. However, while the wait time for
SSDI has drawn increased attention from research and the policy-making arenas, the
relationship between waiting time and how individuals fund consumption remains
unexplored.
Using the 1990 to 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) linked to
the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) 831 file, this paper is the first to examine
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the causal relationship between the waiting time and various coping strategies of appli-
cants for SSDI. Our analysis starts with documenting the evolution of applicants’ in-
come and sources of income before and during SSDI application. The study focuses on
five types of coping strategies that applicants may rely on, including: (1) government
transfers: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); Workers’ Compensa-
tion; and Unemployment Insurance (UI)2, (2) employment and earnings of the
spouse, (3) changing living arrangements, (4) borrowing from credit, and (5) liquidation
of housing assets3.
We then examine how wait time is associated with the use of each coping strategy in the
initial month of application and the average use of each coping strategy over the duration of
the application. We also investigate how the use of each coping strategy changes with time
since application, controlling for the overall application duration using fixed effects. While
this estimation strategy addresses some endogeneity concerns, the correlation between the
time since application and the use of a coping strategy could be due to either causation
(applicants reacting to a longer waiting time) or reverse causation (applicants using the
coping strategy to fund a longer waiting time by appealing an initial denial). To separate
these two effects, we employ an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, using the average
waiting time by state-year-stage to instrument for the actual waiting time, to identify the
effect of an exogenous increase in the waiting time on the use of each coping strategy4.
The findings can be summarized as follows. First, while the correlation between the
wait time and the use of any particular coping strategy, during the initial month or on
average over the spell, is largely absent, we find that applicants with an exogenously
longer waiting durations are more likely to use SNAP benefits both initially and on
average, and less likely to change one’s address over the duration of the application.
Longer wait times are negatively correlated with the probability that applicants receive
UI benefits in an average month over the spell, likely because these benefits cease after
several months. Finally, we find a positive relationship between the time since applica-
tion and spousal employment in the fixed effect model but no such relationship for our
IV regressions. Together, these results suggests that applicants’ spouses do not react to
an exogenous increase in the waiting time by working more, but that a working spouse
makes it more likely that applicants extend the waiting time by appealing an initial
denial.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines SSDI and reviews the exist-
ing literature. Section 3 describes the data and sample construction and presents
descriptive statistics. Section 4 provides an overview of coping strategies and the deter-
mination of eligibility and take-up for each strategy. Section 5 describes how the wait
time is correlated with demographic characteristics, coping strategies used at the time
of application and over time as application progresses. Section 6 discusses the econo-
metric approach and Section 7 summarizes the main results, followed by concluding
remarks in Section 8.
2. Background
Social security disability insurance
SSDI is a social insurance program that provides cash benefits to workers who face a
work-limiting disability expected to last at least 12 months or until death. Individuals
must have worked long enough and recently enough to be SSDI-insured; that is, one
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must have worked an age-specific number of quarters and have worked 20 quarters in
the last 10 years5. SSDI-insured individuals are eligible for SSDI benefits if they are not
currently earning more than the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) level due to a dis-
ability and are expected to be unable to do so for at least a year. SSDI benefits are a
function of an individual’s past labor earnings, using the same formula as Social
Security retirement benefits, without an actuarial adjustment for early receipt of bene-
fits. Individuals with disabilities who do not medically recover will get their full Social
Security retirement benefit in perpetuity, as if they had retired at their Full Retirement
Age6.
SSDI application process
The application process has five stages: First, applicants must not have engaged in
substantial gainful activity (SGA) since disability onset, where SGA is defined as
earnings above a threshold ($1,010/$1690 per month for the non-blind/blind applicants
in 2012). Applications screened out at this stage are labeled “technical denials,” do not
receive a medical review, and are not observed in our data. All other applications are
sent to a state Disability Determination Service (DDS) center, where cases are assigned
to disability examiners for review on a rotational basis7. These applications are deter-
mined at one of the following four sequential stages:
(2)Whether the health condition is severe;
(3)Whether the condition is included in the list of disabling conditions;
(4)If neither 2 nor 3, whether the person can do their previous work;
(5)Whether the person can do any other type of work8.
Due to the sequential nature, each additional stage increases wait time.
Overall, only about one-third of all applications are accepted at these stages. Applicants
denied benefits at this point can appeal, first to the same DDS center that made the original
determination, then to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Notably, ALJs overturn SSA’s
initial rejections in approximately 75 percent of the cases they hear, but there is substantial
variation across ALJs in the award rate (French and Song 2009). Rejected applicants can
then appeal to the central Appeals Board of Washington and finally to a federal court. Be-
cause of the relatively low initial allowance rate and these lengthy appeals processes, the
mean determination time for allowed applicants significantly exceeds that of denied appli-
cants (Autor et al. 2011). Hence, the many stages of initial determination and subsequent
adjudication mean that the application for SSDI benefits can potentially take years.
Even if two applicants are identical in their application/appeals process, the wait time for
an SSDI award can vary by the state in which an individual lives and the year during which
the application is filed. Applicants living in Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia face the longest wait
times; Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Texas,
Utah and West Virginia residents face the shortest (Allsup 2010). There also has been
variation in wait times over time. The time lag between application and decision has been
growing and recent interventions by SSA have tried to address this trend, for example, by
nationwide usage of the Quick Disability Determination (QDD) process or creation of add-
itional ALJ positions and National Hearing Centers. Twenty-four of the 46 states with
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hearing offices saw a reduction in wait times in 2010 compared with 2008. The SSA reports
that the national average processing time for a hearing decision in 2010 was 442 days, down
from 514 days in September 2008 (Social Security Administration 2010). Similarly, the
total hearings backlog has decreased by more than 71,000 cases since December 2008
(Allsup 2010).
For our analysis, we use changes in the wait time by initial determination stages as a
source of exogenous variation in the wait time. To understand the magnitude of this varia-
tion, Table 1 displays the distribution of the average waiting time by application stage for all
states and three large states (California, New York, and Texas) for the years 1990–2010.
Minimum and maximum refer to the longest and shortest average wait time during these
years. Stage three applications have on average the shortest duration and the least variation,
since applicants with a listing condition are allowed onto the program. Average application
times are longer and have more variation for the other stages, primarily because of appeals
process extending wait times. Comparing minimum, average and maximum application du-
rations, one can see a substantial variation in waiting times within a stage and state. For in-
stance, the minimum average waiting time for stage two applications in California is about
4 months and the maximum is about 8 months – a 100 percent difference.
Literature review
Recent work on the duration of the SSDI application process has estimated the causal
effects on applicants’ subsequent employment. Specifically, Autor et al. (2011) find that
the SSDI determination process directly reduces the post-application employment of
Table 1 Distribution of waiting time by application stage
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Stage 2
All 4.99 1.05 2.80 9.68
New York 4.68 0.52 3.58 5.47
California 5.51 1.06 4.07 8.29
Texas 4.98 0.44 4.31 5.95
Stage 3
All 3.93 0.71 2.43 7.52
New York 3.50 0.38 2.81 4.36
California 4.06 0.55 3.48 5.52
Texas 4.00 0.29 3.57 4.58
Stage 4
All 6.02 1.36 3.48 14.77
New York 5.10 0.82 3.82 6.46
California 6.25 1.18 4.56 9.39
Texas 5.85 0.50 5.09 6.93
Stage 5
All 5.78 1.15 3.58 12.82
New York 5.12 0.72 3.83 6.10
California 5.82 0.87 4.61 8.15
Texas 5.72 0.56 4.77 6.97
Notes: The table displays waiting time in months for all states and selected states by application stage for the
period 1990–2010.
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denied applicants by approximately 3.6 percentage points (7 percent) and allowed ap-
plicants by approximately 5.2 percentage points (33 percent). Considerable attention
has also been paid to how applicants fill the health insurance coverage gap during the
29-month waiting period for Medicare benefits (for example, Dale and Verdier 2003;
Riley 2006; Livermore et al. 2009). The evidence suggests that SSDI applicants have
lower health insurance coverage rates for up to three years before application than
non-applicants, and one-quarter of SSDI beneficiaries go uninsured during the waiting
period.
Also related to this work are studies that find a strong earnings decline at and after
onset of a disability. Schimmel and Stapleton (2012) compare individuals who experi-
ence a work limitation to individuals who are observationally identical prior to disabil-
ity onset. They find that earnings declined by 50 percent within two years after onset of
a work limitation and alternative income sources such as UI benefits can only partially
offset the decline of earnings. The similar magnitude of the decline in earnings is also
reported by Dushi and Rupp (2013). Moreover, Meyer and Mok (2013) report that
earnings fall by almost 80 percent during the ten years following a disability onset com-
pared to 5 years before the disability onset.
Because of this strong earnings decline and the fact that applicants receive no income
or medical benefits until their case has been decided, SSDI applicants have fewer finan-
cial resources to fund consumption during the application process. However, little is
known about what these individuals with disabilities live on before receiving SSDI ben-
efits. Honeycutt (2004) finds that a large proportion of new SSDI beneficiaries receive
workers compensation, employer disability, retirement income, and food stamps before
obtaining SSDI benefits. Bound et al. (2003) further our understanding by looking not
just at beneficiaries but all SSDI applicants. Using an unbalanced panel, they examine
income sources three years before, at SSDI application, and three years after applica-
tion. They find that earnings, and to a lesser extent total household income, drop dra-
matically six months prior to SSDI application, but rebound during the subsequent
three-year period. In the early months following SSDI application, a patchwork of tem-
porary disability benefits offset declines in SSDI applicants’ own labor earnings. In the
long run, most of these temporary sources of income decline and are replaced by SSDI
benefits for successful applicants or earnings for denied applicants.
Although these studies shed light on how people might use other income sources as
a coping strategy, it is unclear whether applicants for SSDI rely on other coping strat-
egies more as they experience a longer waiting time, or whether they use other income
sources to extend their waiting time, primarily by filing an appeal. The main contribu-
tion of this study to this literature is to compare both ordinary least squares (OLS) and
IV estimates to parse out the causal relationship between various coping strategies and
the waiting time. Moreover, we use more recent data and expand the list of coping
strategies studied that may be available to applicants.
3. Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics
Data
This study uses data from the SSA’s 831 file linked to household information from SIPP
panels starting in 1990–2008. The SIPP is a nationally-representative longitudinal
survey of households conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The main objective of the
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SIPP is to provide comprehensive information about income and program participation
of individuals and households in the United States. Every four months over a two- to
four-year period, respondents are asked a battery of questions on their labor market
participation, sources of income, employment relationships, demographics and family
structure, health insurance status, wealth, and public program participation during each
month between interviews. New panels began annually between 1990 and 1993, plus
1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008. The SIPP panel is a useful data set for measuring changes
in short term economic well-being.
The SSA’s 831 file is the official disability determination data used by the Disability
Determination Services. When a person applies for SSDI or Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI), an 831 file is opened. We use 831 records to identify the date of the first
application and the type of application (SSDI vs. SSI). The 831 record subsequently
tracks the application through the initial determination and up to reconsideration
level9. To improve the accuracy of application outcomes, 831 files are augmented with
the Master Beneficiary Records (MBR) and the Payment History Update System
(PHUS). MBR and PHUS records contain complete application and determination in-
formation, and are matched to 831 files using application and benefit begin dates,
respectively.
The matched data have the advantage of administrative information on SSDI applica-
tion and receipt that is more accurate than self-reports, plus household and individual
characteristics that are not usually available in administrative records. The long time
span of the data allows us to examine changes over time.
Sample
The sample for this analysis includes individuals who are matched to Social Security
data (they either disclose their Social Security Number or have a match based on name,
birth date, and address so that they can be matched to 831 file) and who applied for
SSDI while being surveyed by the SIPP. We also restrict our sample to individuals age
18 to 66 at the time of SSDI application. We focus our analysis on months during
which an application is pending, i.e., months between the month of filing a claim and
the month of final determination. Person-month observations after SSDI benefits
awarded are excluded from the analysis. These restrictions result in a sample of 4,594
SSDI applicants with 26,136 person-month observations.
Our sample respondents may have multiple disability applications in the years
covered by the administrative data. We focus on the first application we observe in the
administrative data to be sure we can observe income and its sources in the SIPP be-
fore and during application for SSDI benefits. While the vast majority (85.4 percent) of
our sample contains complete information on the first application process, some cases
are pending within the SIPP and thus we do not observe the entire application period.
For these cases, we are able to obtain the application duration and determination infor-
mation from the administrative data, but we do not have associated time-varying demo-
graphics, income amounts or sources, or information related to coping strategies for
applications months that are not covered by the SIPP panel. Moreover, this right-
censoring is more likely to affect individuals with longer application durations com-
pared to individuals with shorter durations, as well as more recent (2008) panelists. If
individuals with different application durations differ systematically in terms of both
Coe et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 6 of 272014, 3:1
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/1
observable and unobservable characteristics, right-censoring may potentially create
biases for our analysis. To address this issue, we run a sensitivity analyses on the sub-
sample for which we observe the entire application period.
One important limitation of our data is that we can only identify applications for
SSDI of SIPP respondents who can be matched to administrative records. Bound et al.
(2010) present matching rates by SIPP survey and differences in demographic charac-
teristics between matched and non-matched SIPP respondents. Non-disclosure rates
are 10–15 percent during the SIPP 1990 panels but increase for the 2001 and 2004
SIPP panels and giving permission to link is nonrandom; matched SIPP respondents
tend to be older, more educated, more likely to be married and to work, and less likely
to report a work limitation. These differences imply that our sample is not fully repre-
sentative of the entire SSDI application population. Differences between matched and
non-matched records also suggest that non-matched SIPP respondents have higher
SSDI application rates. Although imperfect matching poses a limitation to the
generalizability of our study, it is important to note that using SIPP surveys matched to
administrative records is currently the only feasible approach to conduct a comprehen-
sive analysis of coping strategies for SSDI applicants.
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents averages for the socioeconomic characteristics of SSDI applicants mea-
sured at the month of application. The average age of applicants is 45, slightly more
than half are male, and slightly more than three-quarters are white. Educational attain-
ment is roughly evenly distributed between high school drop-outs, high school gradu-
ates, and those who have at least some college. Half of all applicants are married at the
time of application. On average, household income of just over $3,000 per month sup-
ports almost three people. A quarter of applicants have worked in the month of appli-
cation. Almost half of all applicants apply for both SSDI and SSI, suggesting that these
applicants do have relatively strong attachment to the labor force – they have worked
enough to be insured by SSDI – but remain low-income – their income and assets are
low enough that they qualify for SSI benefits.
These demographic characteristics compare relatively well to nationally representa-
tive statistics. For instance, Lindner (2013) analyze the universe of SSDI applicants be-
tween 1991 and 2008 and report an average age of 45.5 at application. He also finds
that 51.3 percent of SSDI applicants apply for SSI. Our wait time is about one month
higher than the average wait time reported in his work, presumably because we meas-
ure the wait time in SIPP survey months and not in exact days10. Moreover, the 2012
Statistical Supplement reports that 56 percent of all new SSDI beneficiaries between
1990 and 2010 were male, close to the 53.8 percent reported here11.
There are numerous differences in demographic characteristics of our sample and
that of Bound et al. (2003). Our sample of SSDI applicants is more likely to be female
and a high-school drop-out, and less likely to be married, and have larger household
size but lower household income. These differences in sample characteristics can
largely be explained by changes in applicants over time. Table 3 compares applicants of
the 1990s to applicants of the 2000s. The starkest difference is the gender composition:
55 percent of applicants were male in the 1990s but only 47 percent are in the 2000s.
This is likely due to the shift towards more labor market activity among women, which
Coe et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 7 of 272014, 3:1
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/1
makes them relatively newly eligible for the SSDI program12. The educational back-
ground of applicants has also changed significantly, with the proportion of applicants
without a high school degree dropping from one-third to one-fifth, likely mirroring
overall trends in education during this time period13. Applicants in the 2000s are also
less likely to be married, and while their monthly earnings and household incomes are
similar, personal income is lower among the more recent applicants.
4. Overview of coping strategies
We examine the following strategies SSDI applicants use to fund consumption while
waiting: (1) government transfers, including SNAP, UI, and workers’ compensation; (2)
earnings of the spouse; (3) changing living arrangement; (4) borrowing from credit
cards; (5) liquidation of housing assets. Given the complexity of these programs, we
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of SSDI applicants, at the month of application
Month of application
Mean Standard deviation
Age 45 0.29
Male 53.8 1.20
Race
White 78 0.92
Black 19.5 0.88
Other 2.5 0.33
Education
High-school drop-out 31.6 1.02
High-school graduate 37.3 1.06
Some college 31 1.06
Marital status
Married 50.4 1.11
Divorced 25.4 0.96
Single 19.2 0.96
Family/household structure
Family size 2.7 0.04
Household size 2.9 0.04
Number of kids in family 0.7 0.02
Employment
Employed this month 25.1 0.94
Income
Income (person) 1,063 42.61
Income (household) 3,086 69.47
Earnings (monthly, person) 415 27.60
Earnings (household) 2,071 59.09
SSDI
Application right-censored 14.6 0.78
Application duration 6.6 0.33
Joint SSDI/SSI application 47.8 1.11
N 4,594
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briefly discuss rules and regulations that are relevant for this study and how eligibility
for each coping strategy is determined. Table 4 summaries the use of each coping strat-
egy at the time of application14.
The supplemental nutrition assistance program
The SNAP is the largest nutrition program for low-income Americans and a mainstay
of the federal safety net. To receive SNAP, households must meet three financial cri-
teria: a gross-income test, a net-income test, and an asset test. A household is automat-
ically or “categorically” eligible for SNAP through the receipt of SSI, Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), or General Assistance benefits. SSI and SSDI
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of SSDI applicants, 1990s vs. 2000s, at the month of
application
1990s 2000s
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Age 45.1 0.3 44.4 0.85
Male 55.2 1.28 47.2 3.02
Race
White 78.1 1.03 77.8 2.01
Black 19.4 0.99 20.1 1.94
Other 2.5 0.37 2.1 0.6
Education
High-school drop-out 33.8 1.15 21.7 2.03
High-school graduate 37.7 1.17 35.7 2.44
Some college 28.6 1.09 42.6 2.9
Marital status
Married 51 1.21 47.7 2.75
Divorced 25.4 1.07 25 2.12
Single 18.5 0.97 22.5 2.95
Family/household structure
Family size 2.7 0.05 2.6 0.09
Household size 2.9 0.05 2.9 0.07
Number of kids in family 0.7 0.03 0.7 0.05
Employment
Employed this month 24.8 1.05 26.4 2.18
Income
Income (person) 1,087 49.44 954 70.1
Income (household) 3,093 76.91 3,057 161.5
Earnings (monthly, person) 415 31.6 417 51.96
Earnings (household) 2,051 65.29 2,164 139.84
SSDI
Application right-censored 13.6 0.83 19.5 2.19
Application duration 6.7 0.38 5.9 0.55
Month of first benefit payment −12.7 0.63 −12.6 0.82
Joint SSDI/SSI application 47.8 1.21 47.6 2.8
N 2,058 2,536
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benefits are part of gross household income. The amount of SNAP benefit that a
household receives is equal to the maximum benefit level less 30 percent of the house-
hold’s net income (reflecting the assumption that an average household will spend ap-
proximately 30 percent of its net income on food). We focus on the use of SNAP
among SSDI applicants15. Overall, 18 percent of our sample report receiving SNAP
benefits at the month of SSDI application (Table 4).
Unemployment insurance
UI is a federal-state partnership providing short-term cash benefits to individuals who
lose their jobs through no fault of their own, i.e. either involuntarily or voluntarily with
a good cause (e.g. due to illness). Unemployed workers are eligible for UI benefits if
they fulfill all monetary and non-monetary requirements. Monetary entitlement re-
quires sufficiently high wage earnings during the first four of the last five completed
calendar quarters before the worker files a claim. Non-monetary eligibility criteria con-
cern both the reason for job separation and ongoing claims. Weekly UI benefit formu-
las specify a minimum and a maximum benefit amount as well as a percentage within
these boundaries. The duration of benefits is either set at a fixed level for all UI recipi-
ents (nine states), or depends on the total amount of benefits unemployed workers can
receive during their eligibility period. Since we cannot infer the reasons for a job separ-
ation from the survey and we are not able to determine the exhaustion of UI benefits,
our analysis focuses on UI recipiency. About 5 percent receive UI benefits at the time
of application.
Workers’ compensation
Workers’ compensation is a state-mandated insurance program that provides compen-
sation to employees who suffer job-related injuries and illnesses. Each state has its own
Table 4 The use of coping strategies at the month of application
Month of application
Mean Standard deviation
Government transfers
SNAP recipiency 18.2 0.43
UI recipiency 5.3 0.67
Workers’ compensation recipiency 6.8 0.54
Intra-family resources
Spousal labor supply
Employment 62.7 1.45
Earnings 2775 80.48
Other financial resources
Borrowing from credit cards
Fraction 17.1 0.82
Amount 3451.1 278.64
Home ownership 58.8 1.11
Locational changes
Changed address 4.1 0.41
N 4594
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laws and programs. Independent contractors are not entitled to workers’ compensation.
Since we do not know where an injury occurred, we are not able to determine the eligi-
bility for workers’ compensation. Overall, nearly 7 percent receive benefits, which is
comparable to the literature (Social Security Administration, 2010).
Changing living arrangement
SSDI applicants could cut expenses by changing their living arrangements, such as
moving into relatives’ house or into lower-costs housing. The only variable that is avail-
able from the SIPP on this dimension is whether respondents change addresses. Over-
all, 4 percent changed their address between the month before and the month of
application. This is much higher than the average move rate16.
Spousal insurance
The interaction of couple’s labor supply has been widely discussed in the literature
(Heckman 1974, for example). Couples can self-insure through intra-family labor mar-
ket substitution; i.e., if one person cannot work, the other spouse can enter the labor
market or earn more. This is often referred to as the added-worker effect. We measure
this strategy by examining: 1) changes in marital status; 2) employment and changes in
employment of the spouse; 3) earnings and changes in earnings of the spouse. At the
time of application, over 60 percent of spouses are working, and the average earnings
among employed spouses are $2,775 per month.
Borrowing from credit cards
An SSDI applicant can also borrow from credit cards to fund consumption while their
application is pending. Overall, 17 percent of SSDI applicants have an outstanding
balance from credit cards in the month of application, which is lower than the 20 per-
cent for the overall SIPP sample of the same age (t = 6.5). Among applicants with a
credit card balance, the average balance is $3,451 and the median is $1,421.
Liquidation of housing assets
SSDI applicants who own a home also can partially or fully liquidate housing assets to
support the consumption. Unfortunately, only information on home ownership is avail-
able from the SIPP; therefore, we will not be able to measure partial liquidation, such
as borrowing from home equity line of credit. About 61 percent of the sample own a
house 12 months prior to application, and only 59 percent at the time of application
are home owners.
5. The use of coping strategies before, at, and after application
The average application duration is over 6 months, or approximately 200 days, but wait
times are quite skewed to the left, as depicted by Figure 1. Specifically, the 25th percent-
ile is 60 days, the median wait time is 101 days, and the 75th percentile is 152 days. The
right tail is also quite long, with 12 percent of the sample waiting at least one year, and
5 percent of the sample waiting more than two years.
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics at the month of application by total application
duration. The first group of applicants has to wait up to 3 months before a final deter-
mination was reached; the corresponding waiting time for the second, third and the
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fourth group is 4 to 6 months, 6 to 12 months, and more than a year, respectively. SSDI
applicants with less than 3 months of wait-time are more likely to be male or whites
and less likely to be divorced, while those who wait longer than 6 months are more
likely to be single. There are a few characteristics that show a U-shaped pattern – there
is a decreasing trend between no wait and up to 12 months of wait-time, but then re-
versing the trend among those who wait longer than 12 months before their final deter-
mination. For example, the average income is $1,116 per month for applicants whose
case is determined within the first three months of applications. Average income
slowly decreases as the wait time increases, to $846 per month for those waiting be-
tween 6–12 months. However, among those whose case takes longer than 12 months
to decide, their average income is back up to over $1,000 per month. This same pattern
holds for employment, income household level and earnings at both the personal
and household level, as well as percent married. We also find that joint SSDI/SSI
application exhibits an inverse U-shaped pattern: about 46 percent for applications
who wait less than 3 months; the fraction peaks at 54 percent for those waiting between
4–6 months, then declines to 41 percent among those wait for more than 12 months.
Much like with demographics, the correlations between using a certain coping strat-
egy at the month of application and the wait time is not monotonic (Table 6). SSDI
applicants who wait for longer than 6 months are less likely to use UI benefits, but
more likely to receive workers’ compensation. While both spousal employment and
home ownership show a U-shaped pattern with the application duration, the share bor-
rowing from credit cards and changing address exhibit an inverse U-shape.
Although we cannot detect much of a relationship between the initial use of coping
strategies and the overall wait time through examining the means (Table 6), it is quite
possible that the use of certain coping strategies changes as time since application pro-
gresses. We next explore how applicants use coping strategies in the months before
and after their SSDI application.
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Figure 1 The Cumulative Distribution of Waiting Times.
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Specifically, we examine changes in household income and coping strategies of our
sample across seven distinct periods related to the timing of the SSDI application, ran-
ging from 20 months before application (approximating the economic status before dis-
ability onset) to 20 months after application17. Figure 2 describes changes in
employment, earnings (whether or not the person is working), and total income over
time at both the individual and household level. Not surprisingly, the percent of appli-
cants employed decreases over time. The decrease in employment starts early, even at
8–10 months before application, not just at the time of application; this finding is con-
sistent with Lindner (2013) who documents employment transitions of SSDI applicants.
Table 5 Descriptive statistics of SSDI applicants, by application duration, at the month of
application
0-3 months 4-6 months 6-12 months Longer than
12 months
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Age 44.8 0.41 45.1 0.5 45.6 0.92 44.9 0.98
Male 55.2 1.61 53 2.21 50.9 3.95 52.5 4.64
Race
White 79.8 1.27 76.6 1.81 75.5 3.17 75.8 2.44
Black 17.5 1.21 21.2 1.76 21.3 3.01 22.4 2.38
Other 2.7 0.48 2.2 0.57 3.2 1.33 1.8 0.77
Education
High-school drop-out 31.5 1.46 31.7 1.98 31.4 3.35 32.3 2.68
High-school graduate 36.9 1.5 37.3 2.04 39.6 3.6 37.3 2.73
Some college 31.6 1.55 31 1.97 29 3.55 30.4 2.53
Marital status
Married 50.6 1.59 46.1 2.1 48.3 3.72 58.8 2.79
Divorced 23.5 1.32 26.9 1.94 28.5 3.32 27.2 2.52
Single 21.1 1.49 21.3 1.74 16 2.63 10.7 1.79
Family/household structure
Family size 2.7 0.06 2.7 0.07 2.7 0.13 2.8 0.09
Household size 2.9 0.06 2.9 0.07 2.9 0.13 2.9 0.09
Number of kids in family 0.7 0.03 0.7 0.04 0.6 0.07 0.8 0.06
Employment
Employed this month 25.8 1.35 23.5 1.82 21.4 2.86 27.6 2.5
Income
Income (person) 1,116 68.12 1,028 75.69 846 89.36 1,075 91.1
Income (household) 3,166 106.23 2,992 124.07 2,846 200.57 3,125 165.55
Earnings (monthly, person) 474 43.43 363 48.26 284 66.66 383 62.95
Earnings (household) 2,170 89 1,954 106.6 1,908 187.94 2,030 141.45
SSDI
Application right-censored 2.9 0.58 9.3 1.25 19.9 3.35 62.7 2.75
Application duration 1.3 0.22 4.1 0.04 8.1 0.13 28.6 1.66
Month of first benefit
payment
5.4 0.31 7.8 0.37 11 0.46 29.4 1.69
Joint SSDI/SSI application 46.4 1.6 53.5 2.11 49.5 3.71 41.2 2.77
N 2,049 1,476 475 594
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Employment also continues to decline over time, but never goes to zero; 16 percent of
the applicants are still employed 18–20 months after they apply for the disability pro-
gram. Earnings decline over time as well; individual earnings declining the most (pri-
marily because of the drop in employment), whereas household earnings and
household income drop less severely.
Table 6 The use of coping strategies, by application duration, at the month of
application
0-3 months 4-6 months 6-12 months Longer than
12 months
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Government transfers
SNAP recipiency 16.9 1.1 19.4 1.6 20.6 3.0 19.2 2.3
UI recipiency 5.5 1.1 6.8 1.1 4.1 1.5 2.6 0.9
Workers’ compensation
recipiency
5.7 0.7 6.9 1.1 7.8 2.0 9.6 1.7
Intra-family resources
Spousal Labor Supply
Employment 63.1 2.0 61.5 2.9 57.6 5.6 66.0 3.4
Earnings 2883 129 2719 134 2650 197 2587 159
Other financial resources
Borrowing from credit cards
Fraction 16.0 1.1 18.5 1.7 19.1 2.8 16.9 2.1
Amount 4278 493 2685 367 2237 493 3021 588
Home ownership 60.0 1.6 57.2 2.1 51.4 3.7 62.2 2.7
Locational changes
Changed address 3.4 0.5 5.5 0.9 2.7 1.2 5.0 1.2
N 2049 1476 475 594
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Figure 2 Evolution of Income and Employment Before and After SSDI Application.
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Along with this decrease in earnings and income comes an increase in needs-based
assistance; SNAP recipiency increases dramatically over time (Figure 3). Unemployment
insurance has a humped-shape over time, with more people receiving UI benefits be-
tween 10 months prior and their application, then decreasing over time as their appli-
cation is reviewed and possibly UI benefits expire. The number of people receiving
worker’s compensation increases over time up to the 10th month after application and
then decreases slightly.
While not shown in the figures, we also find that home ownership declines, suggest-
ing SSDI applicants could be using housing assets to support their consumption. In
addition, the probability of changing address decreases over time. While applicants may
borrow from credit cards to fund consumption while waiting, there is no significant
correlation between borrowing from other financial resources and waiting time.
6. Empirical methods
The descriptive analysis above illustrates some interesting correlations between the wait
time, demographics, and the use of certain coping strategies. However, the pattern may
be confounded by the issue of selection, on either observable or unobservable charac-
teristics. To explore whether and extent to which the length of wait time and other fac-
tors relate to certain coping strategies, we first estimate equations of the following
form:
Strategyit ¼ β0 þ β1AWi þ β2Xit þ γt þ St þ εit ð1Þ
where Strategyit measures each of the five coping strategies indicated above, controlling
for the actual total wait time (AWi), and individual characteristics such as age, race,
education, gender, marital status, and family structure (Xit)
18. We also control for secu-
lar and short-term changes in program participation and family structure by including
a set of year indicator variables (γt). We include a set of state dummies (St) because the
Figure 3 Evolution of Coping Strategies Before and After SSDI Application.
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wait time for a SSDI award varies substantially depending on where the individuals live
and, as highlighted in the public assistance program literature, the use of need-based
programs varies substantially by region and state.
Using this regression approach, we analyze the relationship between outcomes and
the wait time. In the first specification, we analyze Strategyit=a, measuring the likelihood
of using a coping strategy at the time of application as a function of total application
duration (AWi), controlling for individual characteristics. This set of analyses sheds
light on how the wait time is correlated with the initial coping strategy selection.
Second, we analyze the outcome Strategyit for all months of application as a function
of total application duration (AWi). The results of this model represent the association
between the application duration and the average use of a certain coping strategy.
These regressions shed light on the association between various coping strategies and
applicants’ waiting times, but they cannot address how people change their coping
strategies as they face longer waiting times. For instance, research has demonstrated
that a lack of information contributes to welfare program nonparticipation among eligi-
bles (Coe 1983, Blaylock and Smallwood 1984, Hill 1990, Daponte et al. 1999, Wu
2009). Those who are eligible but do not take-up SNAP may also not appeal an initial
SSDI denial due to the unfamiliarity of the program rules, which results in a shorter
waiting time. To understand better how people change their coping strategies over the
course of their waiting time, we next regress the use of a coping strategy on time since
application, using waiting time fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween people with a shorter versus longer overall waiting time. Our regression equation
is written as follows:
Strategyit ¼ β0 þ β1AWit þ β2AWi þ β3Xit þ γt þ St þ εit ð2Þ
where we analyze Strategyit as a function of time since application (AWit), controlling
for total application time (AWi). By adding total application duration fixed effects to
the model, this approach explores the changes in the use of coping strategies since ap-
plication given the length of the overall application duration.
This type of regression controls for heterogeneity in the use of coping strategies re-
lated to the overall waiting time, but it cannot distinguish between applicants reacting
to an exogenously longer waiting time (e.g., because of fewer case workers) and appli-
cants using a coping strategy to file an appeal, which increases their chance of being
admitted into the program but also their overall waiting time. For instance, applicants
with a spouse who can increase his or her work time and thereby contribute more to
household income may be more inclined to appeal an initial denial. To address such
endogeneity concerns, we employ an instrumental variable approach. Specifically, be-
cause the wait time varies substantially by the location of the applicants and his or her
disability condition (see Table 1), we use the average wait time by state-year-stage to in-
strument for the actual waiting time, where stage refers to initial five-stage determin-
ation process.
The first stage estimates the effect of state-year-stage average wait time on the indi-
vidual actual waiting time:
AWi ¼ β0 þ β1SSWsst þ β2Xit þ γt þ St þ εit ð3Þ
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where SSWsst is average state-year-stage wait time. As before, we include state and year
fixed-effects in this regression.
In the second stage, the predicted value of individual waiting time from the first stage
is substituted for actual waiting time.
Strategyit ¼ β0 þ β1ÂWi þβ2Xit þ γt þ St þ εit ð4Þ
where ÂWi is the predicted waiting time. Because we include year and state fixed ef-
fects as well, identification is from within-state variation in the waiting time that does
not reflect common changes across all states in a given year, for instance dues to busi-
ness cycle conditions. The exclusion restriction requires such changes to be uncorre-
lated with other factors that affect the use of coping strategies. We believe that this
assumption is justified because the identifying variation primarily comes from changes
in the number of staff reviewing applications and fluctuations in the number of applica-
tions from year to year that are not common across all states.
The models described above only include the waiting time as a linear term. They do,
however, address some of the non-linearity found in the descriptive section by examin-
ing behavior at both the first month of application and the average use of a coping
strategy over the entire spell. We explored the potential use of quadratic term of the
waiting time to capture further non-linearities. However, the quadratic term was in
general not statistically significant in the reduced form and suffered from a weak in-
struments problem in the IV models (where we construct a squared term of average
wait time by state-year-stage to instrument for the squared value of individual’s wait
time). There are several possible reasons why there is not a detectible role for nonline-
arities in our regression models. The observed nonlinearities in Table 6 are not large
relative to standard deviations; they could represent true changes over time or simply
noise. Moreover, changes in other characteristics that we control for in our models
may explain changes in the use of coping strategies by the wait time observed in the
descriptive analysis. We therefore restrict our subsequent discussion to results for
models that use only the wait time as a linear term.
7. How is application duration related to the use of coping strategies?
Table 7 summarizes regression results using an unbalanced sample, which includes
both completed and right-censored observations19. Column (1) and (3) presents regres-
sion coefficients of linear probability models estimating equation (1) for the two regres-
sions: month of initial application and all months of application. Column (2) and (4)
presents IV results from equations (3) and (4) for month of application and all months
of application, respectively. For the month of application (column 1), the IV measures
whether applicants react to an unexpectedly change in the wait time by changing their
initial coping strategy, during the first month of application. For all months of applica-
tion (column 3), the IV measures how an unexpected change in the wait time is related
to changes in coping strategies over the full course of the application.
Even if instruments are relevant, they might be weak. In that case, instrumental vari-
able estimates may be inconsistent and imprecisely measured. Therefore, Table 7 also
reports the first stage results from estimating equation (3) and the F statistic, which
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Table 7 Regression analysis: unbalanced sample
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5
Application begin Application begin Application months Application months Application duration FE
Coping strategies Number of Obs OLS IV First stage F-test OLS IV First stage F-test Time since application
(months)
Married 3477 0.151 * 0.263 1.403 *** 48.49 0.098 0.281 2.530*** 29.55 −0.093
(0.057) (0.464) (0.202) (0.060) (0.334) 0.46530 (0.117)
Spousal employment 1784 −0.114 −0.313 1.740 *** 35.83 −0.029 −0.133 3.339*** 22.27 0.318 *
(0.840) (0.692) (0.291) (0.082) (0.368) (0.708) (0.161)
Spouse earnings: level 1730 −0.636 −3.39929 1.749 *** 36.18 5.840 14.8879 3.356*** 21.55 9.934
(3.645) (35.084) (0.291) (5.101) (18.097) (0.723) (7.709)
SNAP: recipiency 3477 0.042 0.902 * 1.389 *** 46.24 0.051 0.785 * 2.498 *** 28.98 0.422 **
(0.058) (0.428) (0.204) (0.057) (0.330) (0.464) (0.133)
UI: recipiency 3477 −0.023 0.06 1.389 *** 46.24 −0.022* 0.13 2.498 *** 28.98 −0.144 ***
(0.021) (0.343) (0.204) (0.010) (0.134) (0.464) (0.043)
Workers’s comp: recipiency 3477 −0.024 0.104 1.389 *** 46.24 −0.043** −0.101 2.498 *** 28.98 −0.176 **
(0.024) (0.211) (0.204) (0.015) (0.147) (0.464) (0.067)
Changed address 3477 0.055 −0.092 1.389 *** 46.24 −0.011 −0.109 * 2.498 *** 28.98 −0.083 ***
(0.042) (0.244) (0.204) (0.008) (0.047) (0.464) (0.020)
Home ownership 3477 −0.115 −0.85 1.389 *** 46.24 0.152* −0.453 2.498 *** 28.98 −0.337 *
(0.064) (0.482) (0.204) (0.067) (0.358) (0.464) -(0.133)
Whether borrowed 3477 0.016 0.308 1.389*** 46.24 −0.001 −0.166 2.498 *** 28.98 0.039
credit card loan (0.058) (0.618) (0.204) 46.24 (0.044) (0.305) (0.464) 28.98 (0.133)
Significance Levels: *** 1% le vel, ** 5% level, *10% level.
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tests whether the coefficient of the instrument is zero. Column (5) report results re-
gression results estimating equation (2) for regression of months since application.
Each row of the table presents different regression results for each coping strategy
separately. Coefficients for binary variables are expressed as percentages. Table 7 pre-
sents the results from 55 (11 coping strategies x 5 estimation models) separate regres-
sion models.
With few exceptions, the association between using a coping strategy at the time of
application and total application duration is largely absent (Table 7, Column 1). The
one exception is being married: a one month longer application duration is associated
with an almost 0.15 percent higher probability of being married. However, those who
are married are not more likely to have a working spouse or higher income through the
spouse. To the contrary, the coefficients for spousal employment and spousal earnings
are negative and imprecisely measured. While SNAP recipiency is positively related to
a longer application duration though not significantly different from zero, other coping
strategies such as UI recipiency, and workers’ compensation recipiency are negative,
but insignificant and small. The lack of associations between any initial coping strategy
and the final wait time suggests that applicants do not differ systematically in their ini-
tial use of coping strategies. The third column shows OLS results for all application
months. We find that longer wait times are negatively associated with UI and workers’
compensation benefit recipiency, but positively correlated with home ownership
probability.
We then present results for the likelihood of using a coping strategy as a function of time
since application, controlling for the overall application duration (Table 7, Column 5). We
find that being married is positively associated with total application duration at the month
of application, but is uncorrelated with the time since application, suggesting that being
married is a precondition for people being able to sustain a longer application duration,
and, not surprisingly, applicants do not get married in order to sustain their application.
The role of a working spouse is further corroborated by the positive and significant coeffi-
cient for spousal employment. This suggests an added worker effect: as applicants remain
out of the labor market for a longer time, their spouse starts working to balance lost house-
hold income. An alternative interpretation of the coefficient could be that individuals with
an initially denied application whose spouse finds employment decide to prolong their
application by filing an appeal. The coefficient implies that a three-month longer time since
application is associated with about a one percent higher employment rate of a spouse.
We revisit the interpretation of this coefficient when we discuss the instrumental variables
estimation results.
The positive association between spousal employment and time since application also
implies a positive association between spousal earnings and time since application, but
the coefficient is not precisely estimated. We do not find significant differences for
spousal earnings conditional on employment, suggesting that newly working spouses
have similar earnings than those already working.
Turning to other income sources, one can see that SNAP recipiency is positively re-
lated to a longer time since application. As with spousal employment, these coefficients
are consistent with two interpretations. First, applicants increase take-up as the applica-
tion goes on, or second, initially rejected applicants decide to file an appeal if they can
draw from these income sources. Interestingly, for UI and workers’ compensation
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receipt, we observe negative coefficients, likely because people lose eligibility for these
programs over time.
The last two significant coefficients concern where applicants live. The negative coef-
ficient for a change in address suggests that applicants hold off relocating while
they are in the midst of their SSDI application. However, homeowners – a majority
(58 percent) of applicants – do seem more likely to sell their home as their application
duration increases. These two findings seem contradictory. One way to reconcile these
differences is that homeowners tap into their home equity to fund consumption during
the application process, but renters do not move, perhaps because the money saved in
monthly rent is not enough to justify the fixed costs of moving.
The IV estimates of the relationship between using a coping strategy at the time of
application/all months of application and total application duration are summarized in
Column 2 and Column 4 respectively. The first stage results show that the instrument
tends to have the expected sign and is statistically significant – that is, average state-
year-stage waiting time are positively correlated to individual actual waiting time20. For
instance, in the regression for spousal employment, a one month increase in average
state-year-stage waiting time is predicted to increase individual actual waiting time by
3.4 months. The first stage results also show that the instrumental variable is strong
with F-statistics over 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997).
The IV results put the findings from the last specification in perspective. First, they
corroborate the positive relationship between the wait time and SNAP recipiency and
the negative relationship between the wait time and an address change (when all
months are considered). Second, IV coefficients for spousal employment are negative
and insignificant, in contrast to the positive and significant coefficient for the time
since application specification. These results together suggest that the association be-
tween spousal employment and the wait time is due to reverse causality: a higher spou-
sal employment leads to a longer wait time because applicants can more easily appeal
an initial denial when their spouse works. Such a relationship between the wait time
and spousal employment is captured by the OLS regression but not by the IV regres-
sion. Third, for UI and workers’ compensation, coefficients of the IV regressions are
negative as coefficients of the time since application regression, but insignificant. For
these coping strategies, a reverse causality explanation in combination with negative
effects does not seem plausible, so the lack of significance for the IV coefficients mostly
reflect larger standard errors for IV regressions. Demographic characteristics are corre-
lated with the use of a certain coping strategy as one would expect (see Table 8)21. For
example, age is negatively correlated with using need-based programs and changing ad-
dress, but positively correlated with homeownership and probability of being married.
Minority, low-educated, female applicants, and those with children in the household
are more likely to use need-based transfers to fund their consumption. Husbands of
applicants are more likely to increase their employment as well as earnings during the
application process than wives of applicants. College-educated applicants see the largest
increase in spousal earnings, which could reflect assortive mating and a positive associ-
ation in the market wages between spouses or the lower replacement rate SSDI benefits
among higher earning households. Further, higher education is associated with more
borrowing from credit cards, which likely reveals easier access to this channel of fund-
ing consumption after a disability onset.
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Table 8 Regression a nalysis: unbalanced sample
Outcome variable
Covariates Married Spousal
employment
Spouse earnings:
level
SNAP:
recipiency
UI:
recipiency
Workers’s comp:
recipiency
Changed
address
Home
ownership
Whether borrowed- credit
card loan
Time since −0.093 0.318 * 9.934 0.422 * −0.144 *** −0.176 ** −0.830 *** −0.337 * 0.039
application (0.117) (0.161) (7.709) (0.133) (0.043) (0.067) (0.020) (0.133) (0.133)
Age 0.714*** −0.292* 2.793 −0.279*** −0.027 −0.062 −0.066 *** 0.781 *** 0.310
(0.089) (0.147) (6.664) (0.074) (0.032) (0.042) (0.014) (0.090) (0.083)
Male 9.354 *** −8.229 *** −873.104 *** −6.015 *** 0.920 1.730* 0.219 0.116 −6.991***
(1.674) (2.363) (118.913) (1.395) (0.563) (0.868) (0.217) (1.767) (1.452)
Black −19.975 −2.164 −150.631 8.677 *** −0.122 −0.871 −0.048 −11.948 *** −5.547 **
(2.268) (3.560) (173.658) (1.931) (0.700) (0.956) (0.286) (2.341) (1.885)
Other −1.730 −4.516 305.449 3.896 0.175 2.427 −0.020 −2.810 −0.159
(3.530) (4.986) (427.277) (3.207) (1.347) (2.249) (0.527) (4.108) (3.589)
High-school 0.135 7.335 * 321.987 ** −6.680 *** −0.387 −1.156 −0.149 12.819 *** 4.082 *
graduate (2.283) (3.352) (122.496) (1.846) (0.703) (1.335) (0.293) (2.355) (1.790)
Some college 5.277 * 12.569 *** 932.834 *** −10.901 *** 0.113 −1.085 −0.297 16.983 *** 11.777 ***
(2.362) (3.409) (139.227) (1.823) (0.767) (1.227) (0.290) (2.367) (1.860)
Family size 0.212 *** −0.021 11.664 −0.065 *** −0.007 * −0.005 −0.004 ** 0.110*** −0.015
(0.009) (0.014) (63.503) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.010) (0.008)
Number of kids in −0.155 *** 0.015 −108.576 0.139 *** 0.004 0.004 0.006 ** −0.145 *** 0.007
family (0.013) (0.019) (83.587) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.013) (0.012)
Widowed 14.413 *** −2.056 −2.022 0.439 −5.579 15.711***
(4.005) (1.308) (1.645) (0.577) (4.504) (3.990)
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Table 8 Regression a nalysis: unbalanced sample (Continued)
Divorced/separated 22.667 *** 0.648 −2.775 ** 0.914** −15.870*** 13.286 ***
(1.876) (0.755) (1.001) (0.286) (2.308) (1.906)
Single 18.785 −0.833 −3.905 0.193 −9.766 8.381
(2.246) (0.914) (1.074) (0.361) (2.787) (2.325)
N 4010 2026 1964 4010 4010 4010 4010 4010 4010
Significance Levels: *** 1% le vel, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
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By estimating these relationships for an unbalanced sample, we allow individuals with
potentially very long wait times to influence the results. However, since the wait time
is, at least to some extent, endogenous due to the decision to appeal, and applicants
with a longer application duration are more likely to have some non-observed applica-
tion months due to right-censoring which may potentially create biases, we test the ro-
bustness of our results by estimating these relationships on a balanced panel. This
limits our sample to applicants who have a final decision on their application filed dur-
ing the SIPP panel, and cuts our sample size by 15 percent. Despite these cuts and the
endogeneity concern, our findings are largely consistent between samples22. Interest-
ingly, the IV coefficient for UI recipiency (using all months of application) is significant
for this sample, which seems very plausible: applicants use UI benefits as a coping
strategy as long as they qualify for them.
Finally, as our descriptive statistics show that applicants of the 1990s are significantly
different from applicants of the 2000s, we also explore an interaction model with the
period dummy interacting with the waiting duration. We find that compared to appli-
cants of the1990s, applicants with longer wait-time of the 2000s are increasingly more
likely to use SNAP and UI benefits to fund consumptions while waiting for SSDI bene-
fits, and less likely to use workers’ compensation, sell the house, or borrow from credit
cards.
8. Conclusions
The direct financial consequences of a disability onset are dramatic – previous esti-
mates suggest a 50 to 80 percent drop in earnings. Means-tested programs, tapping
into assets, family assistance and lowering expenses are all potential ways in which one
could cope with this income loss, especially before SSDI benefits kick in. While the re-
lationship between the wait time and any particular initial or average coping strategies
is largely absent, our findings suggest that SNAP is a very important coping mechanism
for SSDI applicants over the course of the application. Those applicants with longer
waiting durations are more likely to use SNAP benefits both as an initial and average
coping strategy. This relationship has some direct policy implications. For instance, it
implies that a reallocation of funds that decrease SSDI wait may decrease outlays for
SNAP and therefore decreases the overall costs of reducing SSDI wait times. Thus, our
findings highlight that such program interactions are important in understanding the
full fiscal implications of changes to the SSDI program.
Another important finding is the relationship between SSDI waiting time and spousal
employment for married individuals. An increase in the waiting time does not appear
to increase the likelihood that an applicant’s spouse works. The added-worker effect –
first hypothesized during the 1940’s as a way for married households to cope with the
widespread unemployment of the Great Depression – has had little support empirically.
Our findings suggest that households do not try to self-insure in the case of disability
onset, at least in the beginning of the disability spell. While Cullen and Gruber (2000)
and Chen (2012) suggest that public insurance programs are crowding out the added
worker effect for households facing unemployment or disability respectively, this
crowding out is absent during the application period when applicants have not yet re-
ceived benefits or even know if they will receive benefits. There are several potential
reasons why we do not find an added worker effect: it could be that liquidity
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constraints are not binding during the waiting period (which seems unlikely given our
findings related to SNAP), that spouses have weak labor force attachments that do not
allow them to increase labor supply even if desired, or that spouses have limited time
to work due to new caregiving responsibilities. Further examination as to why couples
do not seem to self-insure against a disability onset in the short-term is warranted.
While we do not find that spouses increase their employment to cope with a longer
wait time, our IV results in combination with our OLS results for spousal employment
suggest the opposite: an increase in spousal employment leads to a longer waiting time.
Thus working spouses are not providing insurance against the income lost due to a dis-
ability onset, but presumably they afford the household the opportunity for more time
to appeal. If these repeated appeals result in getting on the disability benefit rolls, then
this endogenous decision to appeal based on one’s capability of funding consumption
during the appeals process is an important consideration when thinking about the fair-
ness of a public program with long and optional appeals processes.
Our study highlights that the wait time in itself is an important, but often overlooked,
policy issue. Long wait times, especially because of the appeals process, put a high fi-
nancial strain on people with health impairments. Therefore, reducing these wait times
could be an important part of reforms aimed at making the program more effective.
An alternative to reducing wait times would be to provide easily accessible short-term
disability insurance benefits in combination with return-to-work programs, allowing
more time for work inability screening. Such short-term benefits could alleviate the
need of obtaining other income sources to sustain the application process or to be able
to have a case been reconsidered by a judge.
Endnotes
1Gainful employment is defined here as earning over the Substantial Gainful Activity
(SGA) amount, or more than $1,010 ($1,690) a month for non-blind (blind) disability
beneficiaries in 2012.
2Supplementary Security Income (SSI) cannot be considered as a coping strategy dur-
ing the application determination process because SSI applications are processed like
SSDI applications. Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) is also excluded from the ana-
lysis because there is no information from the SIPP on receiving TDI benefits.
3We also considered receiving financial assistance from family and friends, and with-
drawals from savings or 401(k) accounts as coping strategies, but fewer than 2 (0.5)
percent of the sample reported these types of income and thus are not a focus of this
study.
4Stage refers to the initial determination stage. We discuss this further in the next
Section.
5In order to be covered by SSDI, one must have worked a minimum of 40 or (age-21)
quarters overall and have earned half the credits in the last five years or since turning 21.
While the rules always refer to “covered quarters,” it has been a misnomer since 1978.
Covered quarters are calculated by the amount one makes in a calendar year, not the
amount of time one was employed. In 2012, earnings of $1,130 are required to earn one
quarter of coverage.
6Individuals may be terminated from the disability program due to medical recovery
or by earnings that exceed the SGA under certain conditions. “Medical recovery” is
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determined through continuing disability reviews (CDRs), whose use has varied widely
over time. Stapleton et al. (2010) find that only 4 percent of 1996 SSDI awardees had
their benefits terminated for work in the first ten years in the program. Coe and Rupp
(2013) find that approximately 1 percent of SSDI beneficiaries leave the rolls per year
either due to work effort or medical recovery.
7Exceptions to rotational assignment include high-priority cases flagged as potential
terminal illness cases.
8See http://www.ssa.gov/dibplan/dqualify5.htm (last accessed: 01/15/2014) for a
description.
9In a few cases, the 831 files contain the information on the level of application stage
that goes beyond the ALJ level. However, the quality of the data concerning these
higher-level appeals decisions is questionable.
10For the purpose of our analysis, we include all months from the month of applica-
tion to the month of final determination and calculate the average wait time using
months included in the sample. This definition implies a longer wait time as compared
to exact days. For instance, an applicant who filed on April 15, 2000 that is determined
by June 15, 2000 has an application duration of two months but we include three
months (April, May and June) as application months.
11See http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/.
12The shift toward women seems somewhat larger in our sample than in official sta-
tistics. In the 2010 Statistical Supplement, 59 percent of all beneficiaries were male in
the 1990s and 54 percent in the 2000s. One possibility for the stronger shift toward
women in our sample could be that the matching rate to administrative records for
men declined stronger over time than the matching rate for women.
13Part of this educational change may also reflect higher non-matching rates among
SIPP surveys in the 2000s because individuals not matched to SSA records have on
average a lower educational level.
14For some of coping strategies, we need information from topic modules of the SIPP.
Therefore, the sample size changes due to the merge procedure.
15We focus on the use of SNAP rather the take-up of SNAP among eligible for two
reasons. First, the asset information comes from the special topical module of the SIPP,
which is asked infrequently (the maximum is once each year per panel with the timing
varying substantially by SIPP panel). Second, there is a growing body of research point-
ing to measurement error in many SIPP variables that are critical to estimating public
program eligibility (Strand et al. 2009, and Meyer et al. 2009). For robustness check, we
also examine SNAP take-up among the eligible and the results are largely consistent
with those focusing on SNAP recipiency. The results are available from authors upon
request.
16The mover rate was between 12 and 30 percent per year, or about 1–2 percent per
month, for the last decade (Ihrke and Faber 2012).
17It is worth noting that the sample becomes very small at the last time point
because only those with longer waiting time are included.
18Because our descriptive statistics suggest that there is a U-shaped relationship
between the actual wait time and some coping strategies, in sensitivity tests, we in-
clude a squared term of the actual wait time in our model and the results are largely
similar.
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19The detailed regression results on each coping strategy using the balanced sample
are available upon request.
20Coefficients are not always identical because of different samples used (e.g., only
married applicants for spousal employment) or different covariates (marital status not
needed for spousal employment). For the estimation that has being married as the
outcome measure, the controls are different from other estimations because marital
status are used as controls in other models.
21Table 8 describe all of the covariates included in the model, except state and year
dummies.
22The results are available from authors upon request.
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